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FUTURE PROPERTY INTERESTS IN KENTUCKY
W. LEwis ROBERTS
A future property interest is usually defined as an interest
which entitles the owner to possession of the property only at a
future period, as for instance where one is given the fee in land
to take effect upon the death of the person in possession. In
treating of the subject of future interests, it is customary to con-
sider the following topics: reversions, remainders, executory
devises, construction of limitations, limitations to classes, pow-
ers, rule against perpetuities, and restraints on alienation. In
summarizing the law of future interests in Kentudky, it is pro-
posed to consider it under the usual heads.
I. REvERsioNs, PossmILnTy op R~vETE- AND RiGnT oF ENTY.
In Alexander v. DeKermel1 the court cites with approval
the common law definition of a reversion as given by Blackstone
and Kent. Blackstone's statement defines it in these words:
"An estate in reversion is the residue of an estate left in the
grantor, to commence in possession after the determination of
some particular estate granted out by him;" and "Sir Edward
Coke describes a reversion to be the returning of land to the
grantor or his heirs after the grant is over."12 The court after
attributing to Kent the statement "that reversion, in the gen-
eral sense, must be familiar to the laws of all nations who admit-
ted of private property in lands (4 Kent 389)" concludes "that
from the nature and purpose of reversion they are not as inimi-
cal to our allodial system of titles to lands as remainders, on
which the doctrine of English entails were principally based."
The owner of the property in question in the case of Alexan-
der v. DeKermel conveyed in trust to himself for life, and then
to his heirs. Upon his death he devised the land in fee. The
question before the court was whether the grantor's heirs, who
were his brothers and sisters, were entitled to take or whether the
devisee under the will took. It was held that the devise was good
since "at common law, if a man seized of an estate limited it to
281 Ky. 345, 350; 5 Ky. Law Rep. 382.
2 Blackstone, vol. 2, p. 175.
FUTURE PROPERTY INTERESTS IN KENTUCKY
one for life, remainder to his right heirs, they would take, not as
remaindermen, bat as reversioners, and it would be, moreover,
competent for him, as being himself the reversioner, after making
such a limitation, to grant away the reversion." 3 This result
is, of course, due to the fact that a living person can have no
heirs and that the law leaves in the grantor any part of the fee
not conveyed in the deed. Since what was intended as a remain-
der could not take effect until the death of the grantor, at which
time it would be determined who his heirs would be, there would
by operation of law be a reversion in the grantor in the mean-
time. This would blend, as the court says, in the life estate and
give him a fee so that he could make such a disposition as he
wished in his will. By blending with the life estate the court,
of course, means there would be a merger of the lesser estate in
the greater.
At first glance the facts in the case of Frank Fehr Brewing
Company v. Johnstown, et al.,4 seem the same as those in Alez-
ander v. DeKermel. The owner of land conveyed to trustees to
the use of the grantor for life, and for her heirs, after her death,
if she died intestate, but subject to any disposition she might
make by will, or by deed in the nature of a will. Later the
grantor joined with the trustee in a lease to appellant for a term
of years with an option to buy the property. The appellant
asked for a conveyance under the option. It was held there was
a contingent remainder in the grantor's heirs, subject to the
power of appointment, and there was no reversion to her contem-
plated or possible under the deed.
Of course, since reversions arise by operation of law, the
reversion would arise irrespective of the intent of the parties
as expressed in the deed. The fact was that the grantor had dis-
posed of all her interest in the land during her lifetime and could
make no valid conveyance of it except as provided in her settle-
ment.
The decisions in Prior, et al. v. Castleman,5 Mayes, et al. v.
.KuykendaTl, et al.,6 Coots v. Yewell,7 and Nuekols, et al. v.
2 81 Ky. 352.
497 S. W. 1107, 30 Ky. L. Rep. 211.
5Ky. Law Rep. 967, 7 S. W. 892.
0 112 S. W. 673.
195 Ky. 367, 25 S. W. 597.
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Davis, et al.,s are further illustrations of the principle that
under a conveyance to one for life "with remainder to his (the
grantor's) heirs," the grantor retains the fee in reversion and
he may make a valid conveyance of it during the life tenant's
term or if he dies before the life tenant his heirs can convey the
reversionary interest in fee. This is so because a reversionary
interest is always vested.
In Combs, et at v. Prey9 a mother conveyed a lot to her son,
providing that if the grantee died without issue, then after the
death of the grantee or if his wife survive him and die without
issue by him, then the lot should revert to the grantor or her
heirs. The mother and son joined in a mortgage on the prem-
ises and the son thereafter died without issue and the defeasance
occurred. It was held that the mother did not part with the re-
version by her deed to her son, but did part with it by the exe-
cution of the mortgage: "In the case before us the reversion was
a present estate in her. . . . The right to the property in
case the defeasance occurred was in her."
It seems that if the court is right in describing the son's
interest as a defeasible fee, it is wrong in describing the mother's
interest as a reversion and as a present interest, for if the son
has a defeasible fee, the mother would have a possibility of re-
verter only, not a present estate but the passibility of an estate
in the future, namely, upon the son's dying without issue. Since
a possibility of reverter was not a present estate it could not be
conveyed at common law and nothing would pass at common law
under the ,mother's mortgage.10  Under the view taken by the
court in Green's Admr. v. Irvine,1 1 a possibility of reverter is
Fiscal Ct., 78 S. W. 149; and Mitchefl v. Bourbon County, 76 S. W. 16.
assignable and therefore the result reached in Coombs v. Yrey
would be correct, or it is possible to take the view that there
was really a life estate granted to the son and not a defeasible
fee as stated by the court, in which case there would be a rever-
sion in the mother and the mortgage would convey her interest.
This latter view is taken by the court in Cramer, et at v. EMinc,
8188 Ky. 215, 221 S. W. 507.
9141 Ky. 740.
1 Gray, Rule Against Perpetuities (3rd ed.) S, 13.
u23 Ky. L. Rep. 1757, 66 S. W. 278, also in Halley v. Scott Coun.ty
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et al.,12 where the decision under discussion is cited as "holding
that where there is a conveyance to one for life, and, in case of
the grantee's death without heirs, the land shall revert to the
grantor or his heirs, the grantor takes a fee upon the happening
of the event."
A possibility of reverter is the right of the grantor to have
the ownership of the land revert to him upon the expiration of
the estate granted. As already pointed out, it is not a present
interest or estate13 in the land, but a mere possibility of acquir-
lug an estate. A possibility of reverter is to be distinguished
from a right of entry for condition broken. The former re-
quires no act of the one having the right to put the title into him
upon the happening of the event which is to terminate the estate
of the present holder. A right of entry does require some act
upon the part of the one entitled to enter upon the condition
being broken, either entry or bringing an action to secure pos-
session, in order to regain the title. "A right to enter was not a
reversionary right coming into effect on the termination of an
estate, but was the right to substitute the estate of the grantor
for the estate of the grantee. A possibility of reverter, on the
other hand, did not work the substitution of one estate for the
other, but was essentially a reversionary interest-a returning
of the land to the lord of whom it was held, because the tenant's
estate had determined." 
A possibility of reverter after a determinable f ee became
impossible in England after the statute of Quia Emptores was
passed in 1289.15 This statute provided that whenever one con-
veyed land thereafter, the grantee should hold under the gran-
tor's lord and not under the grantor as theretofore; in other
words, that there should be no further suginfeudation. If B
conveyed land which he held under A as overlord to C, C would
hold under A and not under B. Thereafter if a fee were granted
so long-as a certain tree should stand, and should determine upon
the happening of the event, namely, the falling of the tree spec-
ified, the land would revert not to the grantor but to the lord
= 153 S. W. 18.
"I1 Tiffany, Real Property (2d. Ed.), Section 132.
"Kale's Cases on Future Interests, p. 29.
"Gray's Rule Against Perpetuities (3rd Ed.), S. 31.
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of the grantor. For this reason determinable fees were not
created after the statute Quia Emptores. The statute Quia,
Emptores, however, is not in force in Kentucky, since it is pro-
vided by statute1 3 that all land titles in this state are allodial,
that is, that there are no land tenures. Quia Emptares is de-
pendent upon tenure.
It seems clear, then, that there is no reason why determin-
able fees may not be created in Kentucky. A determinable fee
was a fee simple subject to a limitation which might or might
not happen. The happening of the contingency named fixed,
the quantum or extent of the estate conveyed. The grantor or
his heirs did not secure a .new estate upon the happening of the
event, but regained his old estate. The stock examples of de-
terminable fees were: "An estate to A till B return from Rome,
or an estate to A and his heirs until they cease to be tenants o
the manor of Dale;' "17 or as already suggested, "to A as long as
a certain tree shall stand."
The fee simple upon condition is to be distinguished from a
determinable fee. The former is a fee which may be defeated
by the grantor or his heirs upon the breach of some condition.
If no entry were made or action brought for possession upon
breach of the condition the fee remained in the grantee. The
grantee upon breach of condition has a voidable fee, voidable at
the instance of the grantor, while in the case of the determinable
fee up6n the occurrence of the contingency the estate of the
grantee terminated without any steps being taken on the part
of the grantor or his heirs. The grantee's estate was at an end.
and there was a reverting of the estate to the grantor. It is nec-
essary also to distinguish executory limitations for determinable
fees when the latter phrase is used in its technical sense. The
rule of perpetuities does not apply to possibilities of reverter
after determinable fees while it does apply to executory limita-
tions.s An instance of an executory limitation is a devise to a
wife in fee, provided, however, that in case she marry again,
the land shall be divided among the testator's children. This
conditional limitation never is good as an executory devise.
- Ky. St., S. 2338.
TGray's Rule Against Perpetuities (3rd Ed.), S. 13.
is Gray's Rule Against Perpetuities, Sections 41, 66.
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Courts, however, have erroneously called such an estate in the
wife a "base, or determinable fee."' 19 The position of the Ken-
tucky court that the wife takes a "defeasible fee"20 is not open
to this criticism and has good authority.
To quote from Tiffany in regard to such estates: "Quite
frequently it is said that the first taker has in a case of this
character a 'defeasible fee,' 21 an expression which, it is sub-
mitted, conveys the correct view of the matter, though the ex-
pression 'defeasible fee simple,' would be more absolutely accur-
ate. It is to be observed that the use of the word 'defeasible'
in this connection is incompatible with the view, above criticised,
that the first taker has a determinable fee and not a fee simple,
since an estate which comes to an end by the terms of its creation,
upon the occurrence of an event named, can not well be regarded
as being 'defeated' upon the occurrence of such event.''22
With the general principles just stated in mind it is inter-
esting to consider some of the cases bearing on the subject of
reversionary interests. In Commonwealth v. PoWlitt, et aZ., 23 a
gift was made in a will to a school district on condition that if
the testator's son, who had disappeared, should return and
identify himself, the property should go to him. The court said:
"The bequest is not to the son, and, in case of his death, then to
the school district, but to the school district, subject, however,
to be defeated by the return of the son. The return of the son
is not a condition precedent to the vesting of the gift, but a
condition subsequent, which would defeat the previously vested
gift. . . . We, therefore, conclude that the gift to the school
district is a defeasible fee, subject to be defeated by the return
and identification of the son." The facts in this case seem to
be similar to those of the stock example of a determinable fee
to-wit, "To A in fee but if B returns from Rome then to B."
Then it would seem that the return of the son and his establish-
ing his identity would mark the limit of the interest in the school
district and nothing further would be necessary on the part of
the son to put title of the property in him. If it were a fee upon
" Grant v. Allen, 100 Mo. 293.
21 Riner, et al. v. Faflis, 176 Ky. 575.
-1lkins v. Thompson, 155 Ky. 91, 159 S. W. 617.
"Real Property, vol. 1, p. 561.
25 Ky. L. R. 790, 76 S. W. 412.
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a condition subsequent -which could be defeated by the return
of the son and his identification, the estate would not be termi-
nated until steps were taken on his part to defeat it, as by re-
entry.
The deed in the case of the County Board of Education for
Jefferson Caunty, et al. v. L'ttrel, et al.,2 4 provided that the
property in question should revert to the grantor and his heirs
if the property should cease to be used for public school pur-
poses. The county ceased to use it for school purposes for white
children, but began to use it for colored children. The court
held that this was a breach of the condition and that this land
reverted to the grantors. It was further decided the county
board could not remove the school building from the land as
provided by a statute passed three years after the conveyance
in question, as to allow this would be an imp airment ol the
obligations of contracts. The facts in this case show a condition
and a right of re-entry for condition broken and not a rever-
sion. To quote from Professor Kales: "When the conveyance
is for certain express purposes or upon a motive expressed, or
.upon a certain consideration, with a re-entry clause, or if there
is a covenant with a re-entry clause the estate is upon a condi-
tion subzequent. '"12 5  The grantor then had at most a right of
re-entry which is not a vested interest until there is a breach of
the condition.2 6 Is it not possible, then, that this decision is
wrong as the estate would not vest in the grantor without re-en-
try on his part or his bringing an action to regain possession,
and, furthermore, can it not be said that even though he be en-
titled to the land, the statute in question should have been held
to give the county board the right to remove the building?
Since a right of re-entry is not a vested interest until breach of
the condition the statute could not be held to have affected any
vested rights in this ease at the time of its passage and since the
provision of the contract can at most be construed to be a provis-
ion for a right of re-entry, the right would be subject to the
laws and conditions at the time of the breach of condition when
the right could be exercised.
24 173 Ky. 78.
=Estates, Future Interests (2nd Ed.), S. 219.
11 Gray's Rule Against Perpetuities (3rd Ed.), S. 114.
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In Martin, et al. v. Adams, et al.,27 the court found that the
estate conveyed in the deed was a fee simple, granted to a daugh-
ter and her three children and conditioned upon the care and
support of the grantor for life. It was expressly provided in the
deed that if the consideration of support was not complied with
the title should be forfeited. A disagreement arose between the
grantor and his daughter and the daughter reconveyed the
property to her father, who later granted it to the plaintff in
the case. The three children later set up a claim and the plain-
tiff Ifled a bill namihg them as defendants, to remove a cloud on
his title. It was correctly held that the infant grantees had
no interest in the land, as there had been a breach of the con-
ditions and re-entry; the grantor who had remained in posses-
sion upon the reconveyance had later granted -a fee to plaintiff.
Where land has been conveyed or been taken by condemna-
tion proceedings for turnpikes or public highways and then later
abandoned, some courts have held that the grantor of former
owners recovers the land under a right of reverter. Where the
fee remains in the grantor and an easement alone is taken there
can be no question that the owner has his land free from the
easement upon the abandonment of its use as a highway. Where
there is a conveyance in fee for a valuable consideration, as in
Miller v. Flemingsburg and Fox Springs Turnpike Company;28
Langston, et al. v. Edwards, et al.,2 9 and Hughes, et al. v. H il-
ler,30 the court has held that there is no reversion in the grantor
and that the grantee could dispose of the fee. In Waller v.
Syck 31 the court held that a re-location of a road operated as
an abondonment of the old road and it reverted to the owner of
the land over which it ran. The records did not show whether
the county owned the ground occupied by the old road, and the
court ruled that in the absence of any showing to the contrary
it would presume that the county acquired an easement. Under
such a ruling then, the owner would continue to have title to his
land, but would hold it free from the easement. The court, how-
7 171 Ky. 246, 188 S. W. 318.
2s 109 Ky. 475, 59 S. W. 512.
-" 21 Ky. L. Rep. 1039, 54 S. W. 833.
80 164 Ky. 449. 175 S. W. 631.
146 Ky. 181.
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ever, goes on to say: "When its use was abandoned by the
county, the ground that was occupied by the road reverted to the
appellants, who own the land on both sides of and over which
it ran."
Now, suppose a fee is conveyed in land for turnpike or high-
way purposes and it is stipulated in the deed that if the land
shall cease to be used for that purpose, the fee shall go back
to the grantor. Suppose its use as a turnpike or highway is dis-
continued, does the title vest thereby or must the grantor take
steps to put the title back in him by either a re-entry or bring-
ing an action? In Patterson and Company v. Patterson and
Company,3 2 land was deeded to a turnpike company for a toll-
house and it was provided that when the house should cease to
be used for such purpose, the land and buildings should revert
to a brother and the brothers-in-law of the grantor. Upon a
sale of the turnpike to the county for a public highway, the
persons named in the deed took possession of the tollhouse.
Later they filed a bill in equity against the grantor's heirs to
quiet title. The court held that the defendants' demurrer should
have been overruled, as the rule against perpetuities did not ap-
ply and the interests in the plaintiffs came within section 2359
of the Kentucky Statutes, which provides that rights of reversion
may be sold and conveyed. It did not draw a distinction be-
tween a possibility of reverter and a reversion. The court said:
"If the deed from Nannie Smedley to the turnpike had not pro-
vided for the reversion of the title upon the abandonment of
the use of the land for tollhouse purposes, nevertheless, under
the law of this state, it would in consequence of such abandon-
ment have reverted to the grantor, and, this being true, neither
the statute against perpetuities nor other obstacle stood in the
way of her providing in the deed its reversion to another or
others instead of herself. 33
The case of Kenner, et al. v. American Contract Company3 4
is deserving of more than passing notice. The owner of the land
granted a right of way to a railroad company on condition that
"should the people of Christian county vote a tax for the build-
- 135 Ky. 339, 122 S. W. 169.
mAt page 345.
"19 Bush 202.
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ing or completion of said road" the grant should be void. He
later devised the land to his widow during widowhood and then
to his infant son. Later the railway assigned its interest and
on petition of the voters of the county a tax was imposed to aid
the assignee in completing the road. The assignee thereafter
entered on the land and completed the road. Three years later
the widow in her own right and as guardian of the infant son
brought an action of trespass on the ground that there had been
a forfeiture. One defense offered was that an entry was necessary
to complete the forfeiture. The court said: "The doctrine is well
settled at common law that no freehold or fee simple estate can
be destroyed by the breach or non-performance of a condition
subsequent, unless there is an entry by the grantor or his heirs
after the breach, or some claim equivalent to it. This common
law rule does not apply, however, to estates for years, or to the
creation of mere'easements, or the grant of an incorporal heredit-
ament. An estate for years or an incorporal hereditament is
not created at common law by livery or seizin; and whenever
the breach of a subsequent condition happens in an estate or
grant of this character the estate terminates without any entry.
(4 Kent 128.) An estate that must be created by livery cannot
be defeated without some act equally notorious; and this is the
distinction, so far as the necessity for a re-entry is required, be-
tween freehold estates and estates of less duration, when there
has been a forfeiture or breach of a subsequent condition an-
nexed."
It was further contended that the appellants could not main-
tain the action because they took as purchasers and not as heirs,
as at common law, "the grantor or his heirs only, and not a
stranger or purchaser, can take advantage of the forfeiture."
The court, however, held: "This right of forfeiture or contingent
interest, as well as the land itself, was devised to the appellants,
and we see no reason why they did not occupy'the same position
with reference to this property and the appellee that the grantor
did. There was nothing left undevised to pass to the heir, and
the action by the heir would have been defeated at once by the
production of the will. This identical question was presented
in the case of Haydon v. Stough-ton (5 Pick. 529), where, upon
KENTucKY LAW JOuRNAL
the forfeiture of an estate of freehold, it was adjudged that it
passed to the residuary devisee, and not to the heir."
The court, nevertheless, found that the appellants were not
entitled to recover since they had stood by for three years after
the breach and allowed the appellee to make valuable improve-
ments on the property thereafter.
As to when the statute of limitations begins to run against
the reversioner, the case of Francis v. Wood and Campany3 5
lays down the general rule that it does not begin to run until
the right of entry exists in him. In Berry v. Hall et al.,30 a
deed conveyed property jointly to a husband and wife; the hus-
band after the death of the wife conveyed the whole. After his
death the children were allowed to recover their mother's moiety
as her heirs. The court found that the husband had secured the
original conveyance to himself jointly with his wife without her
knowledge and in fraud of her rights. It held that he could not
gain a title adversely in such a case. The court in Simmons, et
a?, v. MoKey, et al.7 allowed the reversioners to maintain a suit
during the life of the tenant to establish their claim to the land
and to be placed in a condition to make it available when the
time should arrive, at which they would be entitled to the use
of the estate. The court further held that possession acquired
tnder the life tenant could not be adverse, during the life ten-
ant's lifetime, to those entitled after the termination of his es-
tate.
Thus far we have seen that the Kentucky court adopted the
common law definition of a reversion as laid down by Blackstone
and Kent, but that it has not always clearly drawn the line
between a reversion and a possibility of reverter, nor between the
latter and a right of entry. It has held that a possibility of re-
verter is assignable and has agreed with the Massachusetts court
that a right of entry for condition broken may be devised.
4 Ky. L. Rep. 616.
11 Ky. L. Rep. 30, 11 S. W. 474.
(To be continued.)
